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Abstract: 
Do employees care about their relative (economic) position among co-workers in an 
organization? And if so, does it raise or lower their performance? Behavioral evidence 
on these important questions is rare. This paper takes a novel approach to answering 
these questions, working with sports data from two different disciplines, basketball 
and soccer. These sports tournaments take place in a controlled environment defined 
by the rules of the game. We find considerable support that positional concerns and 
envy reduce individual performance. In contrast, there does not seem to be any 
tolerance for income disparity, based on the hope that such differences signal that 
better times are under way. Positive behavioural consequences are observed for 
those who are experiencing better times. 
JEL Classifications: D000, D600, L830 









 I I IN N NT T TR R RO O OD D DU U UC C CT T TI I IO O ON N N     
Calm can be maintained in organizations often only by keeping peoples’ salaries secret (Layard 2003). In China, 
model workers spend their bonuses on treating their work colleagues out to a good meal  in order to avoid 
harassment by them (Elster 1991). Francis Bacon (1890) writes in his Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral that 
“Men of noble birth are noted to be envious towards new men when they rise. For the distance is altered, and it is 
like a deceit of the eye, that when others come on they think themselves go back” (p. 57). Schoeck (1966) reports 
several homicides committed by people overwhelmed by feelings of envy:  
 
 “In 1963, after a basketball game in New York City, a drab-looking day labourer drove his car at the 
good-looking hero who had won the game and who was standing on the pavement with his parents and 
friends. The murderer, who had no interest whatever in the losing team, declared that he just could not 
stand seeing the glamour of that handsome athlete” (p. 129).  
 
“In 1953 a middle-aged spinster in Munich took her friend’s baby out for a walk in its pram. Suddenly she 
pushed baby and pram into the Isar River. The investigation, in which the psychiatrist Ernst Kretschmer 
took part as expert witness, disclosed that the culprit was suddenly overcome with envy of her friend’s 
happiness which the child symbolized” (p. 130).  
 
Envy means negative inequity aversion (Dunn and Schweitzer 2004) and can be characterized by feelings of 
inferiority, subjective injustice, and longing (Parrott and Smith, 1993). It is the strongest emotional reaction to 
being outperformed when performance is important to one’s self-concept (Salovey and Rodin, 1984). Envy often 
leads people to devaluate those they envy, and can even create schadenfreude or pleasure at another’s misfortune 
(Brigham et al. 1997). An envious person may “prefer that others have less, and he might even sacrifice a little of 
his own wealth to achieve that end” (Zeckhauser 1991: 10). Such behavior has been found in laboratory 
experiments, such as ultimatum games (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger 1994). An envious person increases his utility by 
destroying some of the envied person’s assets, even if such an action carries its own costs (cutting off one’s nose 
to spite one’s face). This implies that organizational chains are only as good as their weakest link, and that it is  
<additional information> 
 
                                                    
relatively important to take the negative consequences of positional concern and envy into account. 
Schoolteachers sometimes ask parents not to pack special treats in children’s lunches because other classmates 
may be envious (Elster 1991). Similarly, school uniforms help to reduce possible envy among pupils. 
On the other hand, one can argue that envy and positional concerns lead to better performance, as they 
raise the incentive to achieve a similar status (Schaubroeck and Lam 1994). A positional arms race is provoked 
through the process of rivalry (see Landers et al. 1996). Promotion tournaments aim at provoking ‘rat races’ to 
make the tournament more attractive. Several studies have shows that players respond to the incentives created by 
a tournament
1. 
Other theories stress that people keep on going because of the hope that better times are under way for 
them. According to Hirschman (1973), individuals are willing to give credit to and draw gratification from the 
progress of others for a while, enabling them to suspend envy. He calls this gratification ‘tunnel effect’, stressing 
that such progress generates information about a more benign external environment:  
 
“Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same direction, and run into a 
serious traffic jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I can see (which is not very far). I am in the left 
lane and feel dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift 
considerably, for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn to move will surely come 
any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than before because of the expectation 
that I shall soon be on the move” (p. 545).  
 
It is not only about those who experience a relative disadvantage. Greenberg (1988), for example, found that 
managers who were moved to higher-status offices increased their performance. Thus, a relative advantage can 
boost performance. As long as such a prestige effect is stronger than a negative positional concern effect, there is 
no need for a society, organization or company to slow down the performance of such superstars. Currently, there 
is considerable anecdotal evidence with regard to positional concern. However, empirical evidence about its 
behavioral relevance remains scarce. 
 
1   See also, for example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983), O’Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen 
(1988), McLaughlin (1988), Rees (1992), Prendergast (1999).   
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The main contribution of our study is to provide some answers to the question: How do people react in a 
community setting to an increasing difference in income? Do they perform better or worse? We explore the issue 
in a competitive environment where employees acting in a team experience increasing income differences. To 
collect as accurate evidence as possible, we use two team sports, soccer and basketball, which today are a special 
type of for-profit firms. Using sports data has several advantages compared to other data sources. The data has 
low variable errors. Performance is clearly observable and is free of discrepancies, compared to frequently used 
performance variables, such as GDP. Furthermore, the environment is comparable to field experiments, due to the 
fact that a game takes place in a controlled setting. All players are faced with the same rules and regulations. 
Thus, when investigating the connection between relative concern and performance, many factors can be 
controlled for. The job profile is similar and social comparisons are likely to happen. In addition, transparent 
salary information is available. The evidence obtained is relevant for employees in corporations, as the majority 
work in teams, to some extent like sports teams. Our result, that a relative disadvantage in income induces 
employees’ individual performance to worsen, is of direct relevance to the situation in firms in which team work 
is important – and that applies to a large number of firms today. 
The following section II provides the theoretical background and the hypotheses. Section III presents the 
empirical results and Section IV finishes with theoretical and managerial implications and some concluding 
remarks on study limitations and future research.  
 
P P PO O OS S SI I IT T TI I IO O ON N NA A AL L L     C C CO O ON N NC C CE E ER R RN N NS S S     
Overview 
Leading historical figures, such as Adam Smith (1759), Karl Marx (1849), Thorstein Veblen (1899) or James 
Duesenberry (1949), have long expressed the importance of the relative position and social concerns. 
Nevertheless, the standard literature pays little attention to the consequences of relative position. Accordingly, 
Senik (2004), in providing an overview of the literature, points out that “it is surprising that in spite of the large 
theoretical literature on relative income and comparison effects […] empirical validation of this conjecture is still 
scarce” (p. 47).  
<additional information> 
 
                                                    
Research on happiness (for example, Easterlin 1974, 1995, 2001, Clark and Oswald 1996, Ng 1997, 
McBride 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b, Stutzer 2004, Layard 2003, Luttmer 2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, 
Frey 2008) has stressed, and found strong empirical support for the importance of relative position. However, 
some researchers criticize these studies, as they do not address the behavioral consequences. In addition, the issue 
of finding an adequate reference group has led to controversy. Most studies do not rely on data to explore close 
reference groups, such as neighbors, co-workers, family or friends. Using sports data to compare teammates 
provides the possibility of reducing such shortcomings.  
The pay structure in organizations has important behavioral consequences in work organizations (Harder 
1992). Part of the organizational literature emphasizes the link between pay and managerial performance in 
organizations. However, many studies have been hindered by the lack of data in the past. Lazear (2000: 1346) 
points out that: “Much of the theory in personnel economics relates to effects of monetary incentives on output, 
but the theory was untested because appropriate data were unavailable”
2. Therefore, a number of studies use 
sports data – where performance can be quite well measured – from disciplines like baseball (Hill and Spellman 
1983, Scully 1974), basketball (Wallace 1988, Kahn and Sherer 1988), golf (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990a, 
1990b; Melton and Zorn 2000; Orszag 1994), horse racing (Fernie and Metcalf 1999; Lynch and Zax 1998), 
tennis (Sunde 2003), car racing (Becker and Huselid 1992) and running (Maloney and McCormick 2000) in order 
to test existing theories in promotion tournaments. Such evidence from sports data supports the proposition that 
the overall level of performance rises with the monetary rewards paid. This paper contributes to the growing 
literature that investigates the link between pay and performance. Contrary to previous studies, we also investigate 
the relevance of the relative income position.  
 
Relative Income Situation 
People constantly compare themselves within the organization and care greatly about their relative position, 
which influences individual choices. The literature so far has explored income as the key variable for positional 
concerns. Thus, not only is the absolute level of an individual’s situation important (e.g., pay), but also the relative 
 
2   Abowd (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) investigate the relationship between pay and managerial 
performance or corporate returns, or Asch (1990) for Navy recruiters’ reactions to different incentive plans.  
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position. Frank and Sunstein (2001: 347) point out that “[…] positional concerns typically loom larger with 
income than with the goods that regulation attempts to provide (safety, leisure time, leave to take care of children 
and ailing relatives).” Zeckhauser (1991) observes, “In many workplaces, including most universities, salaries are 
not publicized. Many of us would find our welfare substantially diminished, even though our income remained the 
same, if we discovered that our colleagues were earning more than we were. In part that is because the discovery 
would reveal the boss’s view of us. In part our reaction would be merely envy.” (p. 9). Surveys of employers and 
employees suggest that salaries depend on what employees think other people are paid. Furthermore, their 
perception of their relative position has a considerable effect on their morale (Frank and Sunstein 2001).  
With income as a reference group, some researchers have used hypothetical questions regarding choice 
between alternative states or outcomes, where the choices allow for checking out relative positional concerns. 
Imagine a situation reported by Frank and Sunstein (2001: 336) of two hypothetical worlds. In world A, you can 
earn $110’000 per year while others can earn considerably more ($200’000) and in world B, you can earn 
$100’000 per year while others can earn less ($85’000). In a traditional economic approach, world A would be 
better because it offers higher absolute consumption for its people. But the choices made reveal a different 
picture. A substantial proportion of people opt for world B. Frank (1985) also used a comparison between earning 
$100’000 as a high-income inhabitant of Earth, or emigrating to another planet and earning $1’000’000, but being 
among the worst off in that society. Similarly, Solnick and Hemenway (1998: 377) asked 257 faculty students and 
staff members at Harvard School of Public Health which world they would prefer – world A: Your current yearly 
income is $50’000; others earn $25’000; world B: Your current yearly income is $100’000; others earn $200’000. 
The results indicate that approximately 50 percent of the respondents preferred world A, in which they had half 
the real purchasing power but a higher relative income position. Zeckhauser (1991: 10) asked his American 
students whether they would prefer to find that per capita income is $25’000 in Japan and $24’000 in the United 
States, or $22’000 in Japan and $23’000 in the United States. Many chose the latter and he links such results to 
feelings of envy. Tversky and Griffin (1991: 313) confronted sixty-six undergraduate students with the following 
situation: Imagine that you have just completed a graduate degree in communications and you are considering 
one-year jobs at two different magazines: a) At Magazine A, you are offered a job paying $35’000. The other 
workers, who have the same training and experience as you, are earning $38’000: b) At Magazine B, you are  
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offered a job paying $33’000. The other workers, who have the same training and experience as you, are earning 
$30’000. Approximately half of the subjects were asked which job they would choose and the other half were 
asked which job would make them happier. 85 percent of the first group of students said they would choose the 
job with the higher absolute salary and the lower relative position, but interestingly, 62 percent of the second 
group anticipated higher job satisfaction in the job with the lower absolute salary but the higher relative position. 
 
Reference Group 
If people compare themselves with other individuals then, the key question is: Who is the reference group? 
Festinger (1954) emphasizes that people do not generally compare themselves with the rest of the world, but with 
a much more specific group, typically with others they see as being similar to themselves or, in his words, ‘close 
to one’s own ability’ (p. 121). Similarly, soldiers in World War II seem to have made comparisons primarily with 
members of their own military group (Stouffer 1949). In his Rhetoric (book II, chapter 10), Aristotle stresses that 
envy is felt only towards those people who are  our equals or our peers:  
 
“Potter against potter. 
We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us: these are our neighbours 
and equals; for it is clear that it is our own fault we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys us, 
and excites envy in us. We also envy those who have what we ought to have, or have got what we did have 
once. Hence old men envy younger men, and those who have spent much envy those who have spent little 
on the same thing. And men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy those who have got it 
quickly”. 
 
Similarly, Francis Bacon writes in his Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral that proximity defines the reference 
group: 
 “… near kinsfolks, and fellows in office, and those that have been bred together, are more apt to envy their 
equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes, and pointeth at them and 
cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more into the note of others.”  
 
Workers within the same organizations have an incentive to compare themselves with co-workers. In our context, 
soccer and basketball players, like in other team sports, compare themselves with their teammates. It is therefore a 
strong comparative advantage to work with sports data to be able to build an adequate reference group.  
 
Theoretical Model  
There are several countervailing theories about how income differences influence performance. We will introduce 
several theories. The organizational literature shows that employees care about justice. We assume in our model 
that performance within an organization is not only driven by absolute income but also by relative position. We 
can therefore write the following performance function of a worker i: 
 
Pi =P(A(yi),R(yi, yj))        (1) 
 
Performance in such a model is ceteris paribus a function A of own income yi. The value of the function A(yi) 
gives information about how the absolute income is used to perform or, in other words, how much performance is 
derived from an absolute income. We assume that the absolute income has a positive impact on individual 
performance (∂ P/ A > 0). The value of R(yi, yj) captures the impact of the relative income on performance. We 
assume that relative income or social comparison is a function of the difference in income: R = f (yi −yj). A 
similar approach has been used to explore, e.g., happiness (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Wunder and Schwarze 2006) 
and other social comparisons (e.g., Dakin and Arrowood 1981, Loewenstein, Bazerman and Thompson 1989, 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Wunder and Schwarze (2006), for example, emphasize that social status (relative 
income) can be seen as an important yardstick of self-approval and also captures the information about whether 
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 is larger than the individual income . This means that player i is experiencing a relative disadvantage. 
On the other hand, player i is in a situation of a relative income advantage if the value is negative. 
i y
A β  is a 
weighting variable in case an individual has a relative income advantage and  B β is the corresponding situation in 
case an individual has a relative income disadvantage.   






H H HY Y YP P PO O OT T TH H HE E ES S SE E ES S S
Similarly, an envious person may “prefer that others have less, and he might even sacrifice a little of his 
own wealth to achieve that end” (Zeckhauser 1991: 10). Envy has also been incorporated to explain experimental 
     
Positional Concerns and Behavior 
The theory of social comparison (see Festinger 1954) and the theory of relative deprivation (Stouffer 1949) show 
that comparisons with others are an important phenomenon. Relative deprivation theory investigates interpersonal 
and inter-group relations and comparisons. It stresses that a lower perception of one’s own (group) status or one’s 
own welfare in relation to another person (group) can be the source of hostility towards the other individuals or 
groups. A person may get frustrated when his/her situation (e.g., individual earnings) falls relative to the reference 
group. The person feels deprived. If improvement of the situation is slower than expected, the experience of 
frustration can even lead to aggression (see, e.g., Walker and Pettigrew 1984). The term relative deprivation is 
used to refer to the negative feelings that arise from having less than other people, and it is often said to have 
negative effects not only on mental and physical well-being, but also on behavioral outcomes, such as pro-social 





isadvantage in the relative income 
position increases (
s using ultimatum games (Kirchsteiger 1994). Frank and Sunstein (2001) stress the relevance of the 
relative position: “… preference for good relative position does not explain all of what occurs in the game; 
ensuring a fair outcome, which may or may not call for good relative position, is often the driving factor. But 
relative position also counts for many participants, so much so that ‘difference aversion’ appears to motivate a 
significant percentage of participants” (p. 344). Elster (1991) goes a step further, criticizing that the experimental 
evidence found in ultimatum games is characterized as fairness: “… ‘envy’ would sometimes be more appropriate 
for analogous behavior in real life” (p. 66). Thus, the welfare of an envious person increases by destroying some 
of the assets of the envied person, even if such an action carries high personal costs. Thus, a negative sum 
interaction is started. The performance of those with lower income may decrease due to frustration (“it could have 
or should have been me”). As a consequence, performance is lowered. It is even possible that players with a lower 
salary express their resentment of the players with a higher salary by, for example, not passing the ball so 
frequently to reduce their performance. Inequality can lead to workplace sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright and 
Schminke 2002), employee theft (Greenberg 1988) or stress symptoms (Cropanzano, Bowen and Gilliland 2005). 
Mui (1995) criticizes that “the behavioral implications of envy have not received much attention in the economics 
literature” (p. 311). This paper attempts to reduce this shortcoming. 
The following hypotheses refer to the behavioral consequences of relative depreciation and envy. The first 
hypothesis proposes a negative motivational effect on performance.  
Hypothesis 1:  The performance of the players declines if d
B β < 0).  
 
Keeping up with the Stars 
 contrasting theory argues that large income differences lead to better performance, as they raise the incentive to 
al arms race is provoked through the process of rivalry (see Landers et al. 
A
achieve a similar status. A position
1996). Promotion tournaments aim at provoking a rat race in order to make the competition more attractive. A 
relative income disadvantage is taken to motivate and to generate the ambition to improve the current situation. A disadvantage in the relative income position leads to the ambition of being able to reach the stars within an 





Hypothesis 2:  The performance of the players increases if disadvantage in the relative income 
position increases. ( B β > 0).  
 
n the other hand, not being able to keep up with their teammates may lead to frustration, resignation, and even 
Hypothesis 3:  A decrease in the relative income position leads to a decrease in performance (
O
shame. Such players may feel it is impossible to “keep up with the stars” and give up trying to reach them. They 
may also see the income position as a proxy for the level of appreciation. Players dislike being in a lower income 
position, because the relative position may signal that they and their future prospects are lowly evaluated by 
others. Such perceptions and signals harm their relationship with others, and affect their self-conception and 
performance (Kräkel, 2000). They may be respected less by their co-workers. A lower level of teammates’ trust 
may also affect their involvement within the game. As a consequence, their performance level decreases, as 
formulated in the third hypothesis:  
 
B β < 
 
Waiting for Better Times 
ely tolerance. He stresses that society’s tolerance for income 
0). 
Hirschman (1973) also refers to another effect, nam
disparities is substantial. Individuals are willing to give credit and draw gratification from the progress of others 
for a while, thereby overcoming envy. This ‘tunnel effect’ stresses that such progress generate information about a 
more benign external environment. The positive effect is driven by the hope that the relative disadvantage may 
disappear in the future (“better times are under way for me also”). Thus, the negative comparison effect is 
dominated by a positive information effect. Senik (2008) finds support that the reference income provides a 
source of information rather than a ground for comparison in post-transition countries. Individuals use the income 
of other people in a cognitive information manner rather than as a reason for comparison due to rapid and unstable environmental changes (Senik 2004). Senik finds that, in the United States, if one’s professional peers get an 
income increase, this leads to a positive feeling (life is exciting) rather than a negative feeling (life is dull). On the 
other hand, in Western Europe, the comparison effect is found to dominate the information effect. The tolerance 





Hypothesis  4: A decrease in the relative income position leads to an increase in individual 
performance ( B β > 0).  
 
Enjoying Better Times 
 increase in the relative income position increases work performance. 
Hypothesis 5: An increase in the relative income position leads to increased performance (
One can, on the other hand, argue that an
Players may see it as a sign that their performance is appreciated, and such a situation is perceived as some kind 
of reward. They may gain satisfaction from the improvement in their relative position, which motivates them to 
perform better. Greenberg (1988), for example, found that managers who were moved to higher-status offices 
increased their performance. Thus, a relative advantage boosts their performance. This situation can also be 
interpreted as a prestige effect (Wunder and Schwarze 2006). Players perceive the approval of other persons 
within their environment, which has a positive effect on their performance. This is formulated in the fifth 
hypothesis: 
 
A β > 
 
M M ME E ET T TH H HO O OD D D     
Data 
This paper uses a unique data set of professional basketball and soccer players. We explore the two leagues 
separately, using the same period of investigation (seasons 1995/1996 till 2003/2004)
3. Empirical studies of the 
effects of income differences on managerial behavior have been hindered by the lack of data on individual 
                                                    
0). 
 
3 It was impossible to include 1997 in the soccer data set because player salary information was unavailable.   
<additional information> 
 
pe e lack of publicly available income data. By contrast, in certain sports such as soccer and 
all, individual and team performance is well defined and can be readily observed.  
west Division and the 
acific Division. Three Divisions each have seven teams, and the Central Division has eight teams. Since 1969, 
 has to play an 82-game regular season schedule, playing 41 games at home and 41 away. In 
ntract salary, but also additional salary components, 
uch as bonuses.  
ment. All soccer players are faced with the same rules and restrictions. Thus, when 
vestigating the connection between relative concern and performance, many factors can be controlled for.  
It is useful to develop a composite index for individual performance. A widely used method is represented 





The data used refers to the most prestigious league, namely the National Basketball Association (NBA). There are 
29 teams in the NBA, divided into two conferences (Eastern and Western). Within the Eastern Conference are the 
Atlantic Division and the Central Division. Within the Western Conference are the Mid
P
each NBA team
general, each team plays four games (two home and two away) against every team in its conference, and two 
games (one home and one away) against every team in the other conference. Each team is allowed a maximum of 
12 active players on its roster. Sixteen of the NBA’s 29 teams qualify for the NBA playoffs. To achieve adequate 
comparison, the analysis only focuses on the regular season.  
 
Measuring Players’ Pay 
Basketball games allow us to generate a broad data set, including players’ salaries. A large amount of the data has 
been collected from the website usatoday.com.  Additional sources were used to cover 9 seasons between 
1995/1996 and 2003/2004. The data set covers not only the co
s
 
Measuring Players’ Performance 
The empirical data has low variable errors. Performance is clearly observable and is free of discrepancies. 





), blocks (BLK) and assists (AST), and then subtract the ‘bad things’, 
PERF
(PTS), total rebounds (TREB), steals (STL
namely turnovers (TO), field goals missed (FGMS) and free throws missed (FTMS). Because less skilled players 





FTMS FGMS TO AST BLK STL TREB PTS ) ( ) ( + + − + + + +
   (3)  
Although this proxy gives an in-depth picture of a player’s performance, it is not free of potential biases. For 
example, the equal weight can be criticized. However, even if it is not a perfect measurement of a player’s 
productivity, it provides a good indicator of changes in performance. 
 
Soccer 
ercialization of soccer led to better data sets. For example, i , p  clubs must 
publish their annual reports (Kern and Süssmuth 2003). In some cases (as in the case of the German Bundesliga), 
even salary data for individual players, or at least good proxies thereof, are available. This paper uses a unique 
data set of professional soccer players in the German premier soccer league Bundesliga . IMP, the official data 
provider of the Bundesliga, and several broadcasting networks provided the data. This data includes soccer 
players’ individual performance and personal background data over a period of eight seasons between 1995/1996 
004. During the eight seasons, 28 different clubs participated in the league due to annual promotion 
                                                    




The Bundesliga is one of Europe’s ‘big five’ soccer leagues (for an overview, see Dobson and Goddard 
2001). Interestingly, between 1995 and 2004, the Bundesliga consistently had the highest goals per game ratios of 
all five leagues. Dobson and Goddard (2001: 31) report that, in 1999, Germany was the most ‘cosmopolitan’ 
league, with only 58 percent of the players being German. For the 2000 season, the Bundesliga, (which has 
officially existed since 1902) had the highest average home attendances of all leagues.  
 
4  Summary statistics are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.   
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e between clubs through a 
rookie 
rt the club into a 
shareho
Measuring Players’ Pay 
ide a good proxy for salaries actually being paid by the 
lubs
5. Before a new season starts, the editorial staff develops an estimation of players’ market values. This data 
t and systematic manner for several years by an almost identical editorial team, 
                                                    
The league structure is similar to that of other European leagues, but differs from US sports leagues in 
several key aspects (for a detailed overview, see Hoehn and Szymanski 1999). First, because the structure is open 
(meaning annual promotion and relegation), the teams compete in many hierarchical competitions simultaneously. 
Of the 18 teams that now make up the Bundesliga,  three teams are relegated and promoted each season. 
Furthermore, in contrast to US sport markets that try to maintain a competitive balanc
draft system, longer player contracts and salary caps, there is an active transfer market.  
In the past, German clubs had the legal structure of a private social club (Verein is a non-profit 
organization), but some were also owned by industrial enterprises (e.g., Bayer Leverkusen). However, over the 
last few decades, more clubs have been commercialized; for instance, in the 2000/2001 season, Bayern Munich 
had a total revenue of around €150 million (Haas, Kocher and Sutter 2004). Clubs interact increasingly with 
financial markets. For example, in 1997, members of Borussia Dortmund voted to conve
lding company (Hoehn and Szymanski 1999).  
 
Although the Bundesliga do not officially reveal the salaries of soccer professionals, there is substantial 
transparency. The most prominent soccer magazine in Germany, the Kicker Sportmagazin, develops players’ 
market value estimates on an annual basis. They prov
c
has been collected in a consisten
and is therefore likely to be consistent. To check the extent to which the market value estimations used in this 
paper correctly reflect actual salaries, the correlation between players’ effective reported salaries, as provided by 
another data source called Transfermarkt.de, and our salary proxies is investigated. It may be argued that salary 
estimates are more precise for high-profile players and high-profile teams. This could lead to measurement errors. 
The Transfermarkt.de data has the advantage of covering salary information for high- and low-profile players, as 
 
5   Information from the Kicker Sportmagazin has been used for empirical research studies in the past (see, for instance, Eschweiler and 
Vieth (2004), Hübl and Swieter (2002), Lehmann and Weigand (1998, 1999) and Lehmann and Schulze (2005)).  
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Measuring Players’ Performance 
well as high- and low-profile teams. The correlation between these two data sources is high (r=0.754)
6, so 
measurement errors do not seem to be a major problem. The empirical section will also indicate that the results 
obtained are robust when dealing with outliers. Moreover, the proxies for salaries are even more satisfactory when 
analyzing the relative position of soccer players compared to their teammates and their opponents. Our data set 
includes individual transfer prices, as well as earnings from ticket sales, merchandizing, and sponsoring revenues 
at the team level. We also look at the effect of future and past salaries on current performance.  
 
In line with previous sports papers and our basketball performance proxy, we develop a composite measure of 
performance (e.g., Harder 1992): 
 
 PERFSoccer =  
GP
OF CF DW AS GO + − + +
        ( 4 )  
 
with number of goals (GO), number of assists (AS), duels won (DW), and obtained fouls (OF) entering positively, 
and committed fouls (CF) entering negatively. We divide the resulting value by the number of games played 
ance index allows us to take into accoun
f successful and unsuccessful aggression. The index measures the active involvement and success per game.  
Estimations and Controls 
he 
odel assumes that a player’s current performance is not affected by the amount of money he or she has already 
earned. Rather, a major factor influencing current performance is future pay. Such a model is closely linked to the 
expectancy theory (see Harder 1992). Individual performance is motivated by what a player expects to receive in 
                                                    
(GP). The perform t defensive and offensive aspects, as well as the level 
o
 
Investigating the pay-for-performance relationship requires a model that takes the incentive effects of absolute 
and relative pay into account. Our model studies whether future pay affects a player’s current performance. T
m
 
6   The publicly available data from Transfermarkt.de was only available for the season 2003/2004. Historical data was not available, as 
the Internet site had just started to collect this information in 2005. Furthermore, Transfermarkt.de covers a limited number of players 
in the German Bundesliga.  
<additional information> 
 
termines their present level of motivation and performance. As data on 
 
 players’ individual salaries
7. ABSALi(t+1)  is 
e future salary of a player. The regression also contains several control variables CTRLit such as AGE, AGE 
SQUARED, and a player’s position in the game. Similarly, the estimates include a set of time dummies (TDt) to 
control for possible differences in a player’s environment; μi is the individual effect of player i, and εit denotes the 
error term. We control for ability, since player fixed effects pick up any omitted variables (player characteristics) 
 
the future. Such an expectation de
individual perceptions are not available, we assume that the best available proxy for individual perceptions is 
actual future pay. Thus, our specification has the following structure: 
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 RELSALi(t+1) + β4 ABSALi(t+1)+ TDt + μi + εit     (5) 
 
where PERFit is the performance of player i at time t. RELSALi(t+1)  is the future relative salary of player i, 
measured by the difference between teammates’ average salaries and
th
that do not change over time. 
E E EM M MP P PI I IR R RI I IC C CA A AL L L     R R RE E ES S SU U UL L LT T TS S S
vioral consequences cannot be excluded for those who are enjoying better 
times due to the negative sign of our relative income variable.  
Table 1 presents the results reporting six specifications for basketball and six for soccer. Specifications (1), 
(2 dized regression coefficients of an OLS regression with time fixed 
                                                    
          
We find considerable support that positional concerns and envy reduce individual performance. In contrast, there 
does not seem to be any tolerance for income disparity based on the hope that such differences signal that better 
times are under way. Positive beha
), (7) and (8) report the beta or standar
effects (seasons). The results reveal the relative importance of the variables used. To obtain robust standard errors 
in these estimations, the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors are used. In specifications (3), (4), 
 
7   These are experts’ estimations of players’ salaries after the previous season. As mentioned previously, we check the robustness of the 




ne basketball seasons, ability can be taken to have 
a fixed
(9) and (10), the standard errors by players are clustered, since clustering picks up any player-specific 
characteristics that change over time. Using eight soccer and ni
 and a variable portion. For example, a player’s ability initially peaks and then declines prior to retirement, 
but throughout this cycle the player’s ability stays above a player-specific threshold. Clustering allows us to 
control for the portion that changes over time. Such an effect is partly controlled by variable age. However, it 
makes sense to cluster the standard errors by player, since clustering will pick up any player-specific 
characteristics that change over time. Similarly, ability is controlled for by using fixed effects regressions in 
specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12). In addition, specifications with and without controlling player position in the 
game are presented. We don’t report team fixed effects, as we want to go beyond a ‘within team findings’ focus.  
 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate that, if a player’s salary is below the average, and this difference increases, 
his willingness to perform decreases and the negative effect of positional concerns is more visible. Thus, we find 
support that  B β < 0. The results are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 3. Theories, such as relative deprivation or 
envy, help to predict the impact of the relative income position on performance. On the other hand, hypotheses 2 
and 4 a erences raise the incentive to achieve a similar status, or the ambition to improve 
the current status. There is no support that individuals are willing to give credit to and draw gratification and hope 
from t
re rejected. Income diff
he progress of others within their own organization. Due to the negative sign of the relative income 
variable, hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected. We cannot exclude that there is a positive impact of an above-average 
salary change towards a stronger difference in relation to teammates.  
In sum, the results indicate that relative income position matters. The coefficient is highly statistically 
significant in all 12 regressions. In addition, the beta coefficient for the soccer data set even indicates that the 
relative income effect is stronger than the absolute income effect. 
Table 1 indicates that the coefficient of the absolute income variable is positive. However, the coefficient 




ce performance, having a concave performance 
profile
D D DI I IS S SC C CU U US S SS S SI I IO O ON N N     
o which people within an organization care about their relative (economic) 
positio
ain goals of the paper is to assess 
whether similar observations can be made in different team sports. Sports data allow us to hold many factors 
co e very much like a controlled environment. The game takes place in a controlled 
Theoretical Implications 
uation and thus have a chance of keeping up 
ith their teammate stars. If a player’s salary is below average, and this difference increases, his willingness to 
fect of positional concerns is more visible. Individuals are unwilling to give 
 as a group have a coefficient that differs from zero, is clearly rejected. This result supports the importance 
of the income variables as a group.  
Finally, the control variables show that age tends to influen
 – that is, rising with age but decreasing as physical condition worsens. 
 
Behavioral evidence on the extent t
n is rare. As a novel approach, this paper reveals how such a position affects workers’ performance, using 
sports data from two different disciplines, basketball and soccer. One of the m
nstant, as tournaments ar
environment. All players experience the same restrictions. External influences are controlled by the rules. 
Compared to other approaches, such as laboratory experiments, sports data have the advantage that the 
participation evokes actual and real processes in an environment outside a laboratory setting. Performing well has 
strong implications for professional basketball and soccer players. Laboratory experiments induce much lower 
economic or financial incentives than do actual sport tournaments.  
 
We find support that envy and relative deprivation reduce individual performance in both sports disciplines. 
Players with a relative income disadvantage are more inclined to react by reducing their performance than by 
demonstrating ambition and motivation to improve their current sit
w
perform decreases and the negative ef
credit to and draw gratification from the progress of others and thereby overcome envy. At the same time, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that above-average salaries lead to a positive performance. The strength of the 
theoretical part is to implement a model that allows the inclusion of several countervailing theories on how 




d envy are to be expected. Frank and 
Sunstein (2001) report evidence that perceptions of relative position have large effects on employee work morale. 
al life examples of envy-avoidance and envy-reduction mechanisms.  
y makes 
up a la
performance within an organization is not only driven by absolute income, but also by relative position. In 
addition, our unique data sets, which explore workers’ pay and performance relationship in a controlled 
environment, offer the possibility of exploring several different theories on positional concerns. Working with 
sports data also avoids the problem of finding an adequate reference group. 
 
Our empirical results are cautiously transferable to business practices. Small firms seem to have the most similar 
setting to team sports (see Idson and Kahane 2000). However, the results may also apply to relatively independent 
departments or project teams in larger firms, in which positional concerns an
Similarly, Elster (1991) provides re
We find considerable support that positional concerns and envy reduce individual performance, and that 
there is no tolerance for income disparity overcoming envy and satisfying individuals who hope that better times 
are under way (see Schaubroeck and Lam 1994). These results are especially relevant for the design of merit pay 
programs. Positional concerns and envy are important in areas where measurable performance is directly linked to 
salary (pay-for-performance). In many sales driven organizations, it is common practice that variable pa
rge part of the total salary. For instance, insurance agents are paid according to their sales performance, 
measured by net new money, return on assets, and the number of policies sold. In addition, special rewards are 
given to the ‘best seller’ in a tournament setting. In order to stimulate internal competition among the sales force, 
and to push individual performance, transparency is increased by comparative performance rankings among the 
sales force. Since sales performance translates directly into personal income, these rankings show relative income 
positions. According to our empirical results, best seller rewards and incentive payments, based on sales 
performance ranking, inherently create inequity costs, as they create an outcome with asymmetric payoffs. Thus, 
they run the risk of diminishing, rather than improving, performance among those below the average. The best 
sellers, who dominate the rankings and earn much more than their colleagues, may cause feelings of envy and 
weaken the performance of the entire sales force if they cannot compensate for the loss incurred by envious  
<additional information> 
 
 from lucky punches or advantageous 
contex
Limitations and Future Research 
gher than in most other 
occupations. In addition, the access to published salaries and clear performance measures limits the 
ight differ in situations in which pay and performance are less 
salesmen whose performance is lowered. Although pay-for-performance schemes are helpful to identify low 
performers, they may tend to lower the average performance of the team. 
As a result, there is obviously no one-size-fits-all approach to merit pay. When designing pay-for-
performance mechanisms, firms need to consider the impact on below average performers and deal with the 
negative effects of positional concerns and envy. Sales people at the lower end of the ranking may observe that 
higher ranked colleagues are not performing better, but simply benefit
t factors (e.g., the districts they cover have a higher number of potential clients). Tailoring incentive 
schemes to the needs of different reference groups and the culture within an organization (see Mannix  et al. 1995) 
can hinder perceptions of inequality and prevent disruptive behavior. Furthermore, the distribution of rewards, the 
measurement process of underlying performance indicators and the pay administration procedures need to be 
perceived as fair (Cropanzano et al. 2007, Menon and Thompson 2007) in order to generate the most favorable 
effort outcomes of non-rewarded employees or below average performers.  Additionally, pay-for-performance 
schemes should be complemented with process-oriented non-financial incentives, such as rewards for the best 
team player, best rookie, or most innovative team member of the year. This takes the individual need for social 
distinction into account, using a non-material extrinsic reward and avoiding the reinforcement of selfish extrinsic 
motivation, which crowds out intrinsic motivation (Frey and Osterloh 2005, Frey 2005).  
 
There are some limitations embedded in our research design. Using data from professional sports is in some ways 
unique. On average, the salaries paid in professional basketball and soccer are much hi
generalizability of our work, since the results m
visible or less easily measured.  
With sports data, we observe workers in a controlled environment driven by the same rules and similar 
conditions. Sports labor markets can therefore be seen as a laboratory for observing how incentives work. 





A fruitful direction for future research would be further investigation of the degree to which positional 
concerns and envy reduce individual performance in team settings. Because of focusing on positional concerns 
and envy caused by relative income disparity, we did not look at the impact on organizational trust (Mayer 
2005, Schoorman et al. 2007) and organizational justice (Cropanzano et al. 2007). It would also be 
innovative to combine performance variables with attitudinal questions to measure, for example, whether the 
salary is perceived as unfair, or whether and in what way strong workers feel envy or the need for distinction.   
Despite the limitations mentioned, we hope that our study inspires other scholars to further explore the 
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Independent  Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
SALARY              
RELATIVESAL(t+1)  -0.247*** -0.252*** -0.406***  -0.413*** -0.231***  -0.240***  -0.448***  -0.474*** 
    (-4.56) (-4.66) (-3.73)  (-3.82)  (-2.88)  (-3.00)  (-11.10)  (-11.85) 
ABSOLUTESAL(t+1)  0.444*** 0.443*** 0.735***  0.733***  -0.024  -0.033***  0.027  0.034 
    (7.56) (7.52) (5.90)  (5.84)  -0.27 (-0.38)  (0.66) (0.85) 
PLAYER’S 
CHARACTERISTICS 
            
AGE  -0.011 -0.061 -0.016  -0.088  4.457***  4.513***  0.751***  0.626*** 
    (-0.07) (-0.37) (-0.05)  (-0.28)  (15.20)  (15.25)  (3.30)  (2.82) 
AGE SQ  -0.030  0.024  -0.001  0.001  -0.085*** -0.086**  -0.674***  -0.567** 
   (-0.18)  (0.14)  (-0.14)  (0.11)  (-16.76)  (-16.70)  (-2.98)  (-2.56) 
POSITION No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
SEASON  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
PLAYER  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No No 
F-Test joint 
significance 
557.22*** 553.09*** 278.70***  278.19***  24.98*** 25.37*** 175.98*** 187.21*** 
(REL. & ABOLUTE 
SAL.) 
                       
R-Squared  0.448 0.457 0.448  0.457  0.230  0.236  0.243 0.271 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Groups  (Players)  699 699 699  699  699  699  768 768 
Number of 
Observations 
2807 2807 2807  2807  2807  2807  2143 2143 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
A A AP P PP P PE E EN N ND D DI I IX X X     A A A     
Table A1: Summary Statistics Basketball 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
POINTS  SCORED  516.418 473.074 0  2491 
TOTAL  REBOUNDS  225.609 202.183 0  1201 
STEALS  43.054 37.908 0  231 
BLOCKS  27.506 38.599 0  332 
ASSISTS  117.531 136.715 0  916 
TURNOVERS  78.206 65.672 0  337 
FIELD  GOALS  MISSED 238.598 208.423 0  1153 
FREE THROWS MISSED  34.417  36.396  0  392 
AGE  27.381 4.404  18  43 
GAMES PLAYED  53.277 24.741 1  83 
ABSOLUTESAL(t+1)  3.366 3.558 0.0067  33.1 





Table A2: Summary Statistics Soccer 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
GOALS  2.026 3.239 0.00  28.00 
ASSISTS  2.002 2.576 0.00  19.00 
DUELS  WON  317.008 230.543 0.00  1236.00 
COMMITTED  FOULS  26.045 22.157 0.00  119.00 
OBTAINED FOULS (BEING 
FOULED) 
26.020 24.941 0.00  169.00 
AGE 26.557  4.154  17.00  40.00 
GAMES  PLAYED  18.333 10.055 1.00  34.00 
ABSOLUTESAL(t+1) 3.390 2.748 0.20  25.00 
RELATIVESAL(t+1) -0.035  2.434  -19.73  7.48 
 
 
 